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BY HEIDI Lr FELDMAN

be

This essay is abridged, with permission,
from an article that appeared in the
Southern California Law Review,
March, 1996. A complete version is
available by contacting the author.
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Regardless of its specific content, any black letter statutory codification
regulating lawyers' conduct will be flawed as an instrument of ethics for
lawyers.This is the central thesis of this article. It is motivated by the idea
that typical statutory prohibitions and permissions are likely to stunt
sentimental responsiveness, a key feature of good ethical deliberation.
Additionally, a certain technocratic mode of legal analysis heightens
this tendency.
The technocratic lawyer is a kind of legal minimalist. She aims essentially
for instrumental efficacy in accomplishing goals set by her client. A more
honorable lawyer seeks, at minimum, to ensure that goals explicitly adopted
by the client serve the client's genuine best interests. If one believes that
good lawyering practically always demands good ethical deliberation, then it
follows that the honorable mode of legal analysis should practically always
dominate the technocratic one.

In this article I argue that to the extent
that sound lawyering calls for healthy
ethical deliberation, the technocratic style
interferes. I also argue that statutory codes
of lawyers' ethics elicit the technocratic
style rather than the honorable one.
Finally, I suggest that a common law
approach would at least tend to reverse
this effect.
The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, adopted in 1983, represent the
American Bar Association's most recent
codification of lawyers' ethics. Unlike
earlier ABA regulations, the Model Rules
self-consciously emulate the style, structure
and language of modem civil and criminal
statutory codes. To date, thirty-six states
pattern statutes governing lawyers' conduct
after the Model Rules.

ETHICAL DELIBERATORS

PHOTOS BY THOMAS TREUTER
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THE LAKE PLEASANT BODIES CASE

Black letter legal
ethics can create the
impression that it
rules out the
possibility of
dilemma or tragedy.
If the rules license or
require two
practically
incompatible courses
of action, a lawyer
will not see herself
as facing a dilemma.
Instead, she will
regard both options
as potentially
justifiable and will
select one or the
other on some
external ground. If
the matter goes to
litigation, the court
will rule out one of
the options: Leaving
matters (legally)
tragic is not a
judicially appropriate
outcome.
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The Model Rules strive to be black letter
legal rules. To see this, consider how a
lawyer faced with a famous ethical problem
might well analyze the situation according
to the Rules. The situation, sometimes
called 'The Lake Pleasant Bodies Case,"
is a chestnut of the academic literature on
legal ethics. On Sunday,July 29, 1973,
Robert Garrow fatally stabbed Phillip
Domblewski, an eighteen-year-old student
from Schenectady, while Domblewski was
on a camping trip in the Adirondacks.
About ten days later, after the largest
manhunt in the history of the state of
New York, police captured Garrow. Police
suspected that Garrow had been involved
in several crimes beyond the Domblewski
murder. They had recently found the body
of Daniel Porter, whose death seemed
similar to Domblewski's, about fifty miles
from the place where Domblewski was
killed. In addition, Porter's camping
companion, Susan Petz, had disappeared
"without a trace." Police later came to
suspect that Garrow was also involved in
the disappearance of Alicia Hauck, a
sixteen-year-old high school student, who
had been missing since July 11, 1973.
Shortly after police caught Garrow, the
judge appointed Frank Armani as Garrow's

public defender. Armani had never tried a
murder case, but he had represented
Garrow in several other matters. Armani
recruited his friend, Francis Belge, a noted
trial lawyer from the area, to help him.
Armani and Belge began to prepare an
insanity defense for Garrow.
At the end of August 1973, Garrow
confided to his lawyers that he had killed
Daniel Porter and raped and killed Susan
Petz and Alicia Hauck. Armani and Belge
verified Garrow's claims; shortly after
Garrow's confession, the lawyers found the
bodies of Hauck and Petz, and photographed them. They found Petz's body in
an abandoned mine shaft, and Hauck's
body in a cemetery. In order to fit all of
Hauck's remains in the photo, Belge had
to move her skull. The attorneys did not
disclose their find to anyone, even
though authorities were still searching for
the bodies.
On Sept, 7, 1973, the lawyers met with
the District Attorney to discuss plea
bargaining. While exactly what the lawyers
said is disputed, they at least suggested
they could help police find the bodies of
Petz and Hauck in exchange for favorable
treatment for Garrow. Prosecutors rejected
their offer. About the same time, Armani
was approached by Petz's father for
information, but Armani refused to tell
him anything about his daughter.
Students accidentally discovered the
bodies of Petz and Hauck later that year.
Even after locating the bodies, law enforcement officials were unable to connect
Garrow to their demise until his trial in
June 1974. There, as part of his insanity
defense, Garrow testified in court to killing
Phillip Domblewski, Daniel Porter, Susan
Petz and Alicia Hauck, and to committing
several rapes. Armani and Belge held a
press conference on June 20, during which
they admitted they had known of Garrow's
other crimes, and of the locations of the
bodies, for more than six months.
Garrow was found guilty of
Domblewski's murder and sentenced to
twenty-five years to life. On Sept. 8, 1978,
Garrow escaped from jail. He was shot and
killed by authorities on Sept. 11 .
Upon learning the location of the
women's bodies from Garrow, Frank
Armani, Garrow's lawyer, had to decide
whether to keep this information secret or
disclose it to the authorities, the women's
families, or both. Let us examine a partial
reconstruction of an analysis of this
question under the Model Rules. Three
Model Rules pertain directly to Armani's

situation. Rule 1.6 ("Confidentiality of
Information") states that "A lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation .... " The Rule includes
several exceptions. It allows the revelation
of information the lawyer believes reasonably necessary to prevent the client from
committing a crime likely to lead to
"imminent death or substantial bodily
harm"; the disclosure of matters necessary
to resolve a controversy between the
lawyer and client; and the revelation of
information necessary to a lawyer's defense
against any criminal charge or civil claim
based on the client's conduct or the
attorney's defense against any allegations
made in a proceeding regarding the legal
representation of the client. Rule 8.4
("Misconduct") deems it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects" or to "engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice." The Comment
to Rule 8.4 emphasizes that criminal
offenses involving dishonesty or serious
interference with the administration of
justice indicate lack of fitness to practice
law. In addition, Rule 3.4 of the Model
Rules prohibits a lawyer from "unlawfully .
.. conceal[ing] ... material having
potential evidentiary value" or from
assisting another in doing so.
On the basis of these Rules, a technocratic lawyer could develop defensible
arguments for or against disclosure, and for
or against using information about the
corpses' location to plea bargain.
In fact , the state of New York prosecuted Francis Belge, Armani's co-counsel
in the Lake Pleasant Bodies case, charging
him with violations of several health laws,
including one mandating that a dead body
receive a "decent burial" and one requiring
that "anyone knowing of the death of a
person without medical attendance report
the [death] to the proper authorities." The
court found that the case presented an easy
question, requiring the court to balance
"the Fifth Amendment right, derived from
the constitution, on the one hand . . .
against the trivia of a pseudo-criminal
statute on the other, which has seldom
been brought into play." The court stated,
however, that Belge's behavior hindered
the prosecution's ability to apprehend
Garrow, and that ifBelge had been charged
with obstruction of justice, the court
would have faced a real challenge:

There is no question but that Attorney
Beige's failure to bring to the attention of
the authorities the whereabouts of Alicia
Hauck when he first verified it, prevented
bringing Garrow to the immediate bar of
justice for this particular murder. This
was in a sense, obstruction ofjustice. This
duty, I am sure, loomed large in the mind
of Attorney Beige. However, against this
was the Fifth Amendment right of his
client, Garrow, not to incriminate himself
If the Grand jury had returned an
indictment charging Mr. Beige with
obstruction of justice under a proper
statute, the work of this Court would have
been much more difficult than it is.
In affirming the county court's decision,
the appellate division also noted the larger
legal and ethical issues lurking beneath the
narrow issue presented:

We write to emphasize our serious
concern regarding the consequences which
emanate from a claim of an absolute
attorney-client privilege. Because the only
question presented, briefed and argued on
this appeal was a legal one with respect to the
sufficiency of the indictments, we limit our
determination to that issue and do not reach
the ethical questions underlying this case.
Consider Frank Armani's own actual
reflections - recorded in a television
interview - on his deliberations about
whether to withhold the information he
had received from Garrow. At first , Armani
suggests it was a simple issue: "All we went
by at the time was our oath of office to
keep inviolate the secrets of our clients."
Later, Armani also describes the issue as
involving a question of "which is the
higher moral good." On the one hand,
Armani felt that his duty to defend Garrow
required him to keep silent. "It's a question
of the Constitution, a question of whether
a bastard like [Garrow] having a proper
defense, having adequate representation,
being able to trust his lawyer as to what he
says .... " On the other hand, Armani
knew that the information he held could
ease the pain of the grieving family. Armani
balanced his duty to defend Garrow
"against the breaking hearts of a parent."
In the end, Armani judged that the
families' suffering did not outweigh his
duty to Garrow: "Their suffering was not
worth jeopardizing my sworn duty or my
oath of office or the Constitution." The
extent to which Armani felt a moral
conflict is suggested by a later segment of
the interview in which he discusses his
inability to answer a letter from one of
Garrow's victims' sister. Armani states,
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"I caused them pain .. . What do you say?
Nothing I could say would justify it in their
minds. You couldn't justify it to me."
While Armani did not see the situation
as a close call under the prevailing code of
ethics, neither did he think the code solved
his ethical problem. In fact, the code
created ethical conflict by assigning Armani
a professional duty that conflicted with
other ethical values, particularly the good
of alleviating innocent suffering. Armani's
remarks reveal his deeply emotional and
empathic response to the situation,
demonstrated by his awareness of "the
breaking hearts of a parent," the pain he
caused the victims' families and the evident
anger and revulsion he felt toward
Garrow. Armani also comprehended the
situation's tragedy. He could not fulfill his
duty to Garrow and completely justify
his behavior.
Black letter legal ethics can create the
impression that it rules out the possibility
of dilemma or tragedy. If the rules license
or require two practically incompatible
courses of action, a lawyer will not see
herself as facing a dilemma. Instead, she
will regard both options as potentially
justifiable and will select one or the other
on some external ground. If the matter
goes to litigation, the court will rule out
one of the options: Leaving matters
(legally) tragic is not a judicially appropriate outcome.
I believe that the Lake Pleasant Bodies
case does present a genuine ethical
dilemma. There are good ethical reasons
in favor of Armani keeping Garrow's
confidence, and there are good ethical
reasons in favor of disclosure. In a case like
this, there is no fully satisfactory solution
to the question of the lawyer's conduct.
What is noteworthy about Armani is not
only his appreciation of this sad state, but
his realization of the gap between an
ethical justification and a technocratic legal
one. Armani recognizes that a fully
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satisfactory ethical justification applies
more universally than a narrow technocratic legal one.
But statutory language is distinctly
unsentimental, particularly in the black
letter format. Black letter statutes are
written in terms of imperatives - and,
sometimes, permissions - combined with
descriptive language depicting what is
required or forbidden.
The lawyer consulting the Rules starts
by reviewing them to decide which ones
bear on her situation based on the fit

between the facts of her circumstances and
the scope of the various rules. She checks
for the applicability of any of the exceptions to the confidentiality Rule; she parses
the terms of the Rules pertaining to
misconduct and concealing evidence; she
analyzes the penal code prohibitions on
hindering a prosecution. None of this
activity calls upon her to consult her
sentimental responses to the situation of
Garrow, the missing corpses, the mourning
families and the frustration of law enforcement authorities.

The O.P.M. affair is more complicated,
if less lurid, then the Lake Pleasant Bodies
case. Two dimensions of the O .P.M. affair
are significant: the underlying factual
situation, including O.P.M.'s frauds and
the various attorneys' reactions to them;
and the personal and professional relationships between O.P.M.'s owners, between
these owners and the attorneys and among
the various attorneys.
O.P.M. Leasing Services, one of the
nation's largest computer leasing companies, fraudulently obtained about $225
million from lending institutions before it
collapsed into bankruptcy in early 1981.
O .P.M. operated by buying computers and
other business equipment with borrowed
money and leasing the equipment out,
using the equipment and the leases as
collateral for the loans. Since its founding
in 1970, O.P.M. attracted customers by
offering extremely low rates - rates so low
that it lost money. As early as 1972, the
company's founders and sole owners,
Myron Goodman and Mordecai Weissman,
began defrauding investors to keep O .P.M.
afloat. They began by using leases as
collateral for more than one loan, and later
used fictitious leases to get financing for
computers that did not exist. They also
altered actual leases, inflating the value of
the equipment or changing key terms in
order to borrow larger amounts of money.
Until the late 1970s, Goodman pushed
the company toward ever bigger loans,
dramatically expanding the size of the

company. However, in late 1978, the
company's financial situation became
desperate, and, to avoid bankruptcy,
Goodman began to engage in fraud on a
much larger scale. Goodman and several
accomplices used forged and altered leases
with Rockwell International to defraud
lenders of more than $188 million. These
new loans went to meet payments on old
loans until the company ended up in
bankruptcy in March 1981. In the following year, Goodman, Weissman and their
O .P.M. accomplices pleaded guilty to
charges of fraud.
The law firm of Singer Hutner Levine
and Seeman handled O.P.M.'s legal work
from the time of O.P.M.'s inception.
Goodman selected the firm because his
childhood friend, Andrew Reinhard,
worked there. Singer Hutner handled
O .P.M.'s legal work for the entire decade,
closing loans and writing the legal opinions
that lenders relied on as to O.P.M.'s title to
computers and as to the legality of O.P.M.
leases. Singer Hutner also handled the
personal legal affairs of the O.P.M. owners,
Goodman and Weissman. Reinhard
became a director of O .P.M., and several
other Singer Hutner lawyers were company
officers. From 1976 through 1980, sixty to
seventy percent of Singer Hutner's total
income came from O.P.M. work
According to Singer Hutner lawyers,
they first realized the possibility of O.P.M.'s
wrongdoing in June of 1980. On June 12,
1980, a troubled Myron Goodman went to

The O.P.M. affair became
something of a cause
celebre, in both the popular
press and among legal
ethics experts. In the
affair's aftermath, Hutner
claimed that he "would
have been much happier
protecting the other
lawyers, and in particular
[his] close personal friend,
Peter Fishbein, from getting
in bed with a criminal."

see Joseph Hutner, a senior partner in the
law firm . Goodman told Hutner that he
(Goodman) had done something wrong in
his stewardship of the company, something he could not fix because it involved
millions of dollars. However, Goodman
refused to provide any details because
Hutner could not promise to keep the
information secret. Hutner could not make
such a promise because the firm represented O.P.M. itself and he thus might
have to inform Weissman, the other owner.
Goodman's visit to Hutner was
prompted, at least in part, by the actions of
0 .P .M.'s chief in-house accountant, John
Clifton. Clifton had told Goodman that he
had discovered evidence of the Rockwell
lease fraud, and that he was sending the

information to Reinhard in a letter. After
consulting with his own lawyer, Clifton
had decided to tum the information over
to Singer Hutner and then resign, leaving it
to Singer Hutner to decide whether to
blow the whistle on O.P.M.
While Goodman was still in Hutner's
office, Clifton's letter was delivered to
Reinhard's office down the hall. Goodman
was thus able to retrieve the letter from
Reinhard's office. Goodman took the
Clifton letter when he left Singer Hutner
that day, still refusing to explain what he
had done wrong but insisting it was all in
the past. Goodman, however, urged
Hutner to speak with Clifton's lawyer,
William J. Davis.
Hutner did go to Davis. Davis later
stated that he had been prepared to give
Hutner a copy of Clifton's letter and tell
Hutner everything he wanted to know, but
that Hutner seemed intent on trying to
persuade Davis that Clifton should keep
silent and take back his letter. According to
Davis, Hutner seemed anxious to preserve
a "smoke screen" of deniability.
Singer Hutner thus became aware that it
might be deeply involved in a huge fraud.
The Singer Hutner lawyers decided to
obtain outside legal advice to determine
what their obligations were. On June 25,
and a few days following, they consulted
two lawyers, Joseph M. Mclaughlin, then
dean of Fordham Law School and an
expert on attorney-client privilege, and
Henry Putzel Ill, a former federal prosecutor who had taught professional responsibility at Fordham.
Mclaughlin and Putzel told the Singer

Hutner lawyers that they could ethically
continue to represent O .P.M., closing new
loans and so forth, because Goodman had
assured them there was no ongoing fraud .
They advised the firm to try to discover the
details of Goodman's past wrongdoing to
help them guard against any continuing
fraud, but not to push Goodman too hard
until he obtained a lawyer - the firm's
obligations to O.P.M. might be inconsistent
with Goodman's best interests. In addition,
Singer Hutner was required to keep
everything it had already learned secret,
except from Weissman. Putzel also advised
the firm that it had no legal duty to
withdraw the possibly fraudulently-based
opinion letters that it had provided to
banks for O.P.M.; according to Putzel,
leaving past victims of fraud uninformed
of what happened did not constitute an
ongoing fraud .
On Mclaughlin and Putzel's advice, the
firm did implement some prophylactic
efforts to deal with the possibility of new
attempts to commit fraud . They required
O.P.M. to certify in writing the legitimacy
of each new transaction. However, this
proved to be an insignificant barrier for
Goodman, who simply signed certifications
he knew to be false .
Goodman put off giving Singer Hutner
detailed information of his "past" wrongdoing, and Goodman's new lawyer,
Andrew Lawler, assured Putzel that he
knew of no ongoing fraud . Lawler's
assurances are unsurprising: All of his
information came from Goodman, to
whom Hutner had previously explained
the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
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Both Singer Hutner and
Mclaughlin and Putzel did what
lawyers often do: what their
clients want.
Goodman thus knew that disclosures to
Lawler would only be protected insofar as
they did not indicate an ongoing fraud.
Although there were signs of O.P.M.'s
continuing fraud - bills of sale for
computers that O.P.M. did not have the
money to buy, different bills of sale
containing identical serial numbers, the
sudden resignation of an outside accounting firm - Singer Hutner accepted
O .P.M.'s explanations. Singer Hutner
continued closing loans for O.P.M. despite
these occurrences and despite Goodman's
continuing refusal to disclose the details of
his wrongdoing. Leases securing loans of
$22 million in June, $17 million inJuly
and $22 million in August later proved to
be fraudulent.
In the first week of September,
Goodman finally told Hutner some of the
details of the fraud. Although he still
believed that the fraud had ended by June,
Hutner decided that the firm ought to
withdraw from representation. Singer
Hutner voted formally to resign as O.P.M.'s
general counsel; pursuant to Putzel's advice
that withdrawal had to be accomplished in
the manner least likely to injure the client,
the firm withdrew gradually, completing
the process in December of 1980.
Singer Hutner decided not to disclose
any information about O .P.M.'s fraud .
Based on Goodman's continued assurances
that the fraud had ceased, Putzel advised
that Goodman's secrets were protected by
the attorney-client privilege. Singer Hutner
accepted this view, even after discovering
that Goodman had used Singer Hutner to
close fraudulent loans from June through
September.
On Putzel's advice, the law firm
responded to inquiries from lenders by
stating that Singer Hutner and O.P.M. had
mutually agreed to part ways. Singer
Hutner said nothing of the fraud to the
O.P.M. in-house counsel who was preparing to handle new loan closings, but
instead sent a memorandum suggesting
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verification procedures that should be used
for all O.P.M. financings . Goodman was
able to edit the memorandum to remove
any signals of problems with the Rockwell
leases. Singer Hutner lawyers refused to
answer direct questions from the in-house
counsel as to the propriety of certain
transactions.
Singer Hutner dealt with the law firm
that ultimately replaced them, Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays&: Handler, in the
same manner. Although Hutner wanted to
warn Peter Fishbein, an old friend and a
partner at Kaye Scholer, to stay away from
O.P.M., Putzel advised him he could not
do so. Fishbein phoned Hutner in October
1980 and asked "if there was anything he
should be aware of" in considering
becoming O.P.M.'s counsel. Fishbein said,
"Look, Joe, you and I have been friends for
20 years. I will assume that if there are
problems, you will say, Think twice."'
Hutner's only response was that "the
decision to terminate was mutual and that
there was mutual agreement that the
circumstances of termination would not be
discussed." Kaye Scholer assumed that
O.P.M., which seemed to be a healthy
company, had simply grown too big for
Singer Hutner.
Singer Hutner's silence allowed
Goodman to continue to obtain fraudulent
loans. In December 1980 and early 1981,
Goodman used Kaye Scholer to close
more than $15 million in loans secured by
bogus leases.
The fraud finally came to an end in
February 1981, when a routine inquiry
from a bank lawyer led a Rockwell official
to discover that the signatures of a
Rockwell executive on two leases were
forgeries . Federal prosecutors charged
Goodman, Weissman and five accomplices
with fraud, and O.P.M. went into bankruptcy. Lenders sued Singer Hutner,
Rockwell and several other codefendants as
accomplices in O .P.M.'s fraud . The
defendants settled the suits for $65 million.

None of the Singer Hutner lawyers was
charged with any crime.
The O .P.M. affair became something of
a cause celebre, in both the popular press
and among legal ethics experts. In the
affair's aftermath, Hutner claimed that he
"would have been much happier protecting the other lawyers, and in particular
[his] close personal friend , Peter Fishbein,
from getting in bed with a criminal." Based
on Putzel's counsel, Hutner maintained
that the prevailing statutory code of
lawyers' ethics prevented him from doing
this. Yet Geoffrey Hazard, a leading legal
ethics expert hired by Fishbein, insisted
that Putzel had misinterpreted the prevailing code, despite some language that
seemingly warranted Putzel's reading.
The relevant Model Code provision,
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(l), as modified
when incorporated into New York law,
stated:

A lawyer who receives information
clearly establishing that . .. [his] client has, in
the course of representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the
same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal except when the information is protected as a confidence or secret.
According to Hazard, the confidentiality
exception provided some basis for Putzel's
advice to Singer Hutner, but a further
exception - to the confidentiality rule
itself - trumps. This further exception
excludes from confidence any communications in furtherance of the client's
wrongdoing during the course of the
representation. Since Goodman continued
to rely on Singer Hutner's work products
while revealing to Singer Hutner his
fraudulent transactions, Hazard argued,
Singer Hutner could have fully disclosed
O.P.M.'s wrongdoing. At minimum,
according to Hazard, Hutner could have
alerted Fishbein to problems with the
transactions that involved Singer Hutner.

Hazard stated that an interpretation of the
Code that found Singer Hutner lawyers
neither obligated nor permitted to disclose
at least that information to Kaye Scholer
was "conceivable, but wrong."
In the O.P.M. affair, Singer Hutner,
McLaughlin and Putzel and Hazard all
engaged in technocratic lawyering: They
focused on mere compliance with the
black letter ethics codes.
Without doubt, in defrauding their
investors and customers, Goodman and
Weissman acted both illegally and
unethically. More interesting is the
situation Goodman created for Singer
Hutner by continuously deceiving them
about O.P.M.'s condition and the nature of
its dealings. As the relationship between
O.P.M. and Singer Hutner progressed, the
law firm had various opportunities to
discover or plumb the depths of O .P.M.'s
problems and wrongdoing, but the firm
consistently chose not to.
As the O.P.M. fraud scheme developed,
it became ever more important for
Goodman to hide his doings from Singer
Hutner. The Singer Hutner lawyers, in
tum, allowed this so as not to have to take
legally required action on the basis of
knowledge of an ongoing fraud. By
superficially cooperating with O.P.M.'s
scheme, Singer Hutner made it difficult for
itself to effectively represent O.P.M.,
because Singer Hutner never had a realistic
or full awareness of O.P.M.'s operations.
More vividly, Singer Hutner's financial
interests in continuing to represent O.P.M.
put the firm in the position of not wanting
to fully understand O.P.M.'s transactions,
and this presumably interfered with its
ability to represent O.P.M. Had O .P.M.
come clean with Singer Hutner earlier,
Singer Hutner might have been able to
discourage criminal activity, ultimately
reducing or eliminating criminal penalties
imposed on Goodman and Weissman.
McLaughlin and Putzel helped Singer
Hutner develop an approach and a legal

justification for continuing to represent
O.P.M. Singer Hutner's continuing silence
about O.P.M.'s wrongdoing lay at the
center of this plan. In essence, McLaughlin
and Putzel advised Singer Hutner to
require repeated assurances from
Goodman that he was no longer
defrauding investors and customers.
Goodman repeatedly supplied these
pledges, and Singer Hutner repeatedly
accepted them -despite the obvious
reasons for doubting Goodman's credibility
and independent evidence of more fraud,
such as bills of sale for computers O.P.M.
could not afford, suspicious lease
documents and the abrupt resignation of
an independent accounting firm.
Both Singer Hutner and McLaughlin
and Putzel did what lawyers often do: what
their clients want. Goodman wanted to
continue O.P.M.'s operations; he wanted
Singer Hutner to facilitate this; Singer
Hutner did. For a time, Singer Hutner
wanted to continue to represent O .P.M. as
long as it could do so lawfully; McLaughlin
and Putzel devised an arguable legal
justification and approach to permit this.
Acting in their technocratic capacities, both
Singer Hutner and McLaughlin and Putzel
served their clients. McLaughlin and
Putzel, however, were better technocrats
than Singer Hutner.
Singer Hutner consistently made
choices about cooperation and competition
that actually undermined the firm's ability
to serve its client's best interests, let alone
accommodate anybody else's. Even if we
consider how Singer Hutner's choices may
have furthered its own short-term financial
interests, the firm did a poor job of
considering its own long-term interests,
particularly in preserving its reputation.
Whatever their success or failure as ethical
deliberators, the Singer Hutner attorneys
performed poorly as technocratic lawyers.
Not so, however, with McLaughlin and
Putzel. While they could perhaps have
done a better job, their lawyering had at

least some technocratic merit. At the time
Singer Hutner consulted McLaughlin and
Putzel, the law firm's position was already
dicey. While not actively aware of ongoing
fraud, Singer Hutner had reason to suspect
trouble, based on Goodman's vague
confession. Working with the presumption
of continued representation, McLaughlin
and Putzel had to develop a strategy that
would legitimate Singer Hutner's
competing legal obligations under New
York law. Singer Hutner had to keep its
client's confidences and avoid aiding
ongoing fraud.
McLaughlin and Putzel did not achieve
technocratic perfection. Following their
advice kept Singer Hutner in the dark
about O.P.M.'s actual operations. It also
may have created the appearance that
Singer Hutner had always known more
than it ever acknowledged, and that the
firm's circumspection about the reasons for
withdrawal was more narrowly selfprotective than I have suggested. Nonetheless, given Singer Hutner's difficult position
and the prevailing statutory code of ethics,
McLaughlin and Putzel provided somewhat
competent technocratic legal advice.
Of course, even competent lawyering
can be criticized on lawyerly grounds.
Geoffrey Hazard disputed Putzel's
interpretation of then-current New York
law, arguing that better legal advice would
have permitted - perhaps even have
dictated - disclosure of O.P.M.'s
wrongdoing, at least to Kaye Scholer.
Hazard's objections are grounded in a rival
interpretation of the relevant statutory text,
focusing on the meaning of terms such as
"confidence" and "ongoing fraud" and the
relationship between one statutory
provision and another. Putzel's argument
depended on the same sort of skillful
technocratic analysis.

LAW QUADRANGLE N OT ES

SUMMER

1996 57

Unlike the Lake Pleasant Bodies
example, which included Frank Armani's
post hoc reflections, in the O.P.M. case we
have little direct information about the
various attorneys' thoughts and feelings as
they deliberated Singer Hutner's behavior.
Still, we can reconstruct the lawyers'
deliberative experiences well enough, I
think, to see how closely they captured the
essence of ethical deliberation and to
ascertain the role of the statutory code.
Relying upon virtue ethics theory and
Armani's example, I have argued that the
good ethical deliberator possesses at least
three features: willingness to consider but
question established moral precepts;
willingness and ability to recognize ethical
dilemmas; and capacity to respond to
specific features with warranted sentiments
and to be guided by these sentiments in
making ethical judgments. Neither Hutner
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nor Mclaughlin and Putzel seem to have
displayed these qualities. In fact, by
consistently exercising technocratic legal
analysis to determine how the black letter
code could be construed so as to permit
their preferred outcomes, it appears the
lawyers stifled these trademark qualities.
When Singer Hutner consulted
outside legal counsel, they did not seek
Mclaughlin and Putzel's advice as to what
the firm should do, regardless of the law's
dictates. There is no evidence that this
was because either Singer Hutner or
Mclaughlin and Putzel reflectively equated
ethical conduct with legally acceptable
behavior. In fact, the data suggest otherwise. Hutner experienced pangs of
conscience over his deception of his old
friend Peter Fishbein, the Kaye Scholer
partner. Hutner explained his behavior by
saying he was just doing as the law
required - giving no sign that he ever
stopped to consider whether the law's
commands, as he understood them, were
ethically appropriate. Nor is there any
evidence that Mclaughlin and Putzel, the
so-called ethics experts, did more than

provide technocratic legal analysis. While
they consulted codified ethical rules,
neither Singer Hutner nor Mclaughlin and
Putzel took personal moral responsibility
for their respective actions and recommendations.
Without certain sentimental responses
to specific features of the O.P.M. situation,
it makes sense that the attorneys neither
perceived the extent of the ethical dilemmas present nor felt personal moral
responsibility for their actions. As we saw
with Frank Armani, emotional engagement
of the appropriate kind is at least part of
what makes an ethical deliberator sensitive
both to ethical dilemmas and to his own
ethical responsibility in the circumstances.
Note that the clash between good
ethical deliberation and technocratic legal
analysis occurs regardless of the quality of
the lawyering. Mclaughlin and Putzel,
who provided relatively good technocratic
services, fared no better as ethical
deliberators than Singer Hutner, whose
technocratic advice was rather poor.

THE VALUE OF RULES? THE VALUE OF LAWYERS?
Statutory codes of professional ethics
seem to trigger in lawyers dispositions that,
at worst, run counter to ethical
dispositions, and, at best, make them
appear superfluous. Here, I address two
arguments against concern.
The first is an argument from the
general value of rules. In broad form, this
argument maintains that rule-based
decisionmaking has various advantages.
Rules can save time, eliminate arbitrariness
and maximize correct results over numerous judgments. My own critique of
statutory, codified lawyers' ethics is not a
general attack on rules or rule-based
decisionmaking. Yet I do maintain that
whatever advantages codified black letter
rules offer in other settings, they do not
obtain when it comes to fostering ethical
deliberation in lawyers.
Proponents of codified ethics rules for
lawyers might defend them in the interest
of achieving uniformity and predictability
of lawyers' conduct or in the name of
preventing lawyers from acting as moral
individualists, deciding ethically difficult
situations however they please. But as
demonstrated by the technocratic fight
between Hazard and Mclaughlin and
Putzel and the competing technocratic
analyses available to Armani, codified
ethics rules can provide technocratically
able lawyers with justification for opposite
courses of action. Skillful technocratic
analysis will often leave lawyers with at
least colorable arguments in favor of a
variety of actions in an ethically difficult
situation. At this point the attorney will
have to rely upon uncodified principles to
decide what to do. Not only will she be
free to exercise moral individualism, she
will have to.
The second argument against worrying
over the antiethical tendencies promoted
by codified lawyers' ethics bites the bullet:
It does not praise statutory ethics, it
defends lawyers' reactions to them and,
more generally, lawyers' typical responses
to ethically difficult situations. Philosopher
Bernard Williams, for example, says that
current society may well need people to
perform the functions lawyers do, and this
performance may well necessitate somewhat different dispositions in lawyers than
in laypeople. Under these conditions,
nonlawyers might well accept the necessity
of the lawyerly dispositions and actions,

even though the general public will be
disposed to regard these as distasteful or
repugnant.
Recall that, in my opinion, Frank
Armani confronted a genuine ethical
dilemma: Whether he kept or disclosed
Garrow's confidence, he would be making
a tragic choice. Not everybody shares my
view of the situation. Some think it clear
that Armani had an authentic, overriding
ethical obligation to keep mum; others
think that he was straightforwardly
ethically required to reveal the location of
the corpses. This schism implicates some
large issues, particularly the merits of an
adversary system of legal justice and,
within it, the peculiar position of the
criminal defense lawyer. Without delving
deeply into these matters, let me stress that
whatever one's opinion on the disclosure
question, Armani still deserves praise for
the character of his ethical deliberation.
Despite this defense of the intrinsic
merits of good ethical deliberation, those
who are positive that Armani should have
informed the police and the victims'
parents may object that Armani ultimately
acted no differently from the highly
zealous criminal defense attorney, who is,
in this view, an unethical cad. These
objectors might even argue that Armani is
less ethically worthy than the zealot, who
at least may have deep - if mistaken ethical cor:i.victions in favor of keeping
repugnant clients' confidences. In contrast,
Armani simply acted hypocritically,
abiding by prevailing norms of client
confidentiality despite serious ethical
qualms about them.
This line of criticism is flawed. It is
important not to equate or confuse the
zealot with the technocrat. Whatever one's
opinion of zealous criminal defense, the
zealous criminal lawyer may or may not be
a technocratic attorney: Her commitment
to her clients could be at least somewhat
tempered by other concerns, without
disqualifying her as a zealous advocate.
To act as the zealous lawyer is not thereby
to behave technocratically.

In conclusion, think of the relationship
between technocratic lawyering and good
ethical deliberation as a tradeoff: The better
somebody is at one, the worse she is at the
other. Nobody can do well at both. This
oversimplifies, but it captures the essence
of what I have said earlier. In response,
someone might argue that I have overlooked at least part of what good lawyering
entails. I have claimed that it requires
facility with distinctively unsentimental
legal analysis, at the expense of more
sentimental ethical deliberation. My
interlocutor might claim, however, that a
lawyer's function includes providing good
ethical deliberation. A genuinely fine
attorney would not possess traits so
antithetical to good ethical deliberation; at
least, he would not hone such traits to the
point where they crowd out more ethical
dispositions. He would strike a balance
between technocratic and ethical dispositions, and he would therefore be able to
practice lawably - perhaps somewhat less
easily - while retaining the traits and
skills needed for good ethical deliberation.
In short, he would be an honorable lawyer.
Two flaws in this reasoning emerge
immediately. First, one person's balance is
another's uneasy compromise. That is, the
lawyer who tries to maintain lawyerly and
ethical dispositions simultaneously might
find himself delivering poor legal advice
and defective ethical deliberation. Even if
this worst-case scenario is unlikely a matter for empirical investigation proponents of the view that a lawyer's
function includes ethical deliberation need
to define specifically the desirable balance
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If juries assessed lawyer
misconduct, the concepts used
to evaluate attorneys' ethical
performance would tend to
retain some significant degree
of connection to ordinary
ethical blend concepts.

between unsentimental lawyerly dispositions and more sentimental ethical ones.
They must show the attainability of this
balance. Finally, they must convince us
that good ethical deliberation is part of the
lawyer's function . That this remains to be
shown is the second glaring flaw in their
argument.
Suppose, however, that we could
vindicate the position that good lawyering
includes good ethical deliberating. Then
we would have to figure out how to create
lawyers suited to this function. It is hard to
imagine that statutory codes of ethics
would have much of a role, for the reasons
I have already given.
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To stand a chance of triggering ethical
dispositions, statutes would have to be
written in terms that tend to elicit appropriate sentimental responses. For example,
if we want lawyers to disregard confidentiality when innocents are suffering unnecessarily, we would have to write codes
referring to "innocence," "suffering" and
"sorrow," as well as "loyalty." However
worded, they would certainly be contentious, precisely because they would be
meant to call forth specific emotional
responses to ethically challenging situations, where we typically lack consensus
on what these responses should be.
Moreover, if virtue ethicists are correct
about the uncodifiability of ethical judgment, it will not matter how we word our
statutes: They will always be too general to
be of assistance in highly contextual ethical
decisionmaking, especially in hard cases.
Finally, if we present lawyers with statutory ethical codes, these may trigger the
antiethical lawyerly dispositions, no matter
what their wording or structure. Lawyers'
training may incline them to respond to
statutes with technocratic analysis rather
than ethical deliberation even when the
statute is written in unusually sentimental
language. Attorneys may read and respond
to statutory text technocratically, no matter
what its vernacular.
Many who lament the current state of
attorneys' conduct associate the problem
with twentieth-century changes in the
nature of law practice, especially in elite
firms. These firms, supposedly the pilots
of the bar, no longer possess or provide
the stability they once did. Clients parcel
out their legal business per service,
using different firms for different jobs.
Partners and associates change firms fairly
frequently, voluntarily or otherwise.

To end on a speculative note, let me
suggest that this sort of flux would be
likely to erode any sort of informal
"common law" of lawyers' ethics that may
once have held greater sway. If such an
informal common law ever existed, it may
well have been dominated by idiomatic
blend concepts, tailored to lawyers' ethical
lives. For example, within a firm, all
attorneys might have developed a shared
sense of what counted as unprofessional or
rotten conduct, and they may have been
able to educate long-term clients about
these understandings. Such an informal
common law might also have made use of
nonspecialized ethical blend concepts,
invoking concepts like pity, mercy
or loyalty.
With the erosion of the conditions
necessary for its maintenance, this sort of
informal common law would disintegrate.
It would not be surprising if black letter
codes emerged in response, attempting to
substitute crisp imperatives and permissions for the lost informal common law.
It would be wiser to develop a new, more
formal, more institutionalized common law
of lawyers' ethics. Instead of elliptical bar
disciplinary reports and the very occasional
prosecution for attorney misconduct,
courts, lawyers and legislatures should
expand the opportunities for traditional
adjudication of lawyers' ethical conduct.
If juries assessed lawyer misconduct, the
concepts used to evaluate attorneys' ethical
performance would tend to retain some
significant degree of connection to ordinary ethical blend concepts. Just as the
legal concept negligence retains a tie to the
ordinary concept of carelessness, case law
could develop ethico-legal concepts with
links to ordinary ethical concepts. Serious
litigation of attorneys' ethical performances
would generate a body of case law, like
other such bodies, replete with the sort of
contextual engagement with specific factual
situations that makes for good ethical
deliberation. Opinions in these cases could
apply and explain traditional ethical blend
concepts and, possibly, generate new ones,

tailored to the special circumstances of
attorneys attempting to act ethically within
the confines of law practice.
I would advocate creating civil causes of
action, available to those allegedly injured
by an attorney's ethical misconduct,
allowing plaintiffs to recover both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. A civil suit
does not carry the same degree of stigma as
a criminal prosecution. This should
increase judges' and fellow attorneys'
willingness to litigate lawyers' ethical
misconduct. At the same time a lively civil
cause of action for attorney ethical misconduct would reintroduce shame as a
deterrent. The prospect of public jury trials
and potential verdicts against them may
discourage lawyers from exercising
technocratic skills at the expense of robust
ethical deliberation. Just as physicians view
a judgment of malpractice as an embarrassment to be avoided, lawyers might come to
be ashamed of conduct considered
unethical by a jury.
Even if we grant that the initial litigation
over attorney ethics will be somewhat
unpredictable, the more robust the
common law in the area becomes the more
predictable the outcomes of lawsuits will
be. This should produce a pattern of lawful
conduct, settlement and litigation similar
to other areas policed through civil causes
of action. Attorneys should be no more
vulnerable to or protected from the
vagaries of civil enforcement than any
other group.
In sum, common law can inspire
lawyerly responses antithetical to
unsentimental technocratic analysis and
can make it difficult to formulate
technocratic arguments in specific factual
settings. Active civil litigation and a serious
body of case law concerning lawyers' ethics
might well trigger more honorable
lawyering, a legal style more consistent
with - perhaps even conducive to authentic ethical deliberation.
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